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The current “litigation explosion” (Olson, 1991), accompanied by changing defi -
nitions of liability (Landes & Posner, 1987; White, 1980), has driven up insurance 
rates (Abelson, 1988; Abraham, 1987) and prices for drugs and other potentially in-
jurious products, resulting in calls for product liability reform (Litan & Winston, 
1988; Schwartz, 1988; Viscusi, 1991). A frequently noted characteristic of many 
product liability cases in that the trial outcome is often very unpredictable, in terms 
of both who wins (Huber, 1988) and the size of damage awards (Greene, 1989;) 
Harris et al., 1984; Peterson, 1986). Although jurors are instructed to consider only 
the formally presented evidence in reaching a verdict (Devitt, Blackmar, Wolff, & 
O’Malley, 1992), they sometimes fail to do so; rather, they may be infl uenced by a 
variety of “extra-legal “ characteristics. 
Extra-legal characteristics may be divided into two broad classes: “case-specifi c” 
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Two experiments were performed to investigate the role of extra-legal factors 
in a simulated product liability trial. In cases where the factual evidence was 
identical, subjects’ liability judgments varied as a function of the case-specifi c 
factor of the alleged source of the plaintiff’s injury. In deciding cases differently 
depending on the alleged cause, subjects relied on intuitions about what injury 
sources are more or less likely to cause a certain kind of injury. Juror- specifi c 
factors also infl uenced subjects’ verdicts. There was no difference between 
students and non-students, but race and SES—factors that are often correlated 
with student status—did affect subjects’ verdicts. Low-SES and minority subjects 
were more likely to fi nd the defendant liable than high-SES and white subjects. 
The results are considered in terms of general decision-making processes, and 
the implications for jury selection and mock jury research are discussed. 
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factors that pertain to the litigants or to the case itself (for a general review, see Da-
vis, 1989), and “juror-specifi c” factors that derive from individual characteristics of 
the jurors. Jurors, as a group, are not evaluating legal evidence objectively and con-
sistently if the decisions of sub-groups (e.g., men vs. women) in similar cases are sys-
tematically different. Likewise, they are considered biased if sub-groups of litigants 
(e.g., black vs. white defendants) in similar cases are treated differently. 
Most research on the relationship between juror verdicts and extra-legal factors 
has been done on criminal trials. There is considerable similarity between civil and 
criminal trials, especially in terms of the jury’s task: to estimate the relative proba-
bility of competing hypotheses and compare their judgment to a standard of proof in 
reaching a verdict (Kaye, 1988).Jurors themselves appear to make little distinction be-
tween civil and criminal processes (Hans, 1992). However, there are also some very 
important differences, such as the standard of proof, the separation in criminal trials 
of the roles of victim and prosecutor (combined in the civil plaintiff), and the goals 
served by the process. Since less research has been done within the civil paradigm, it 
is generally unknown whether fundamental processes will hold true for both kinds of 
trial. For example, the fact that the victim in a civil trial stands to profi t materially by 
the outcome—unlike the criminal victim, whose sole benefi t is usually the satisfac-
tion of seeing justice done—might alter the effect of victim characteristics found in 
criminal trials (Dane & Wrightsman, 1982). 
Both criminal and civil law are ultimately concerned with assigning responsibility; 
yet they differ in that criminal verdicts carry greater moral connotations, while civil law 
can be viewed more as a tool for resolving confl icts that individuals cannot settle pri-
vately (Lempert & Sanders, 1986). In civil torts, jurors’ task is to attribute responsibili-
ty (or in legal terms, liability) for an injury. The primary factor in attributing liability is 
usually attribution of causality (Hart & Honore, 1985)—that is, showing beyond a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury.l
Causation is an important feature of torts for two reasons. First, causation in the 
law is treated as an objective matter that can be factually determined by adherence to 
intuitive, common-sense notions (Hart & Honore, 1985), with reference to scientifi c 
evidence. The facts that bear on whether or not the defendant caused the plaintiff’s in-
jury are less subjective than questions about whether the defendant foresaw or intend-
ed the harm, which would require insight into the defendant’s mental state. 
Second, although causation is not always necessary, and often not suffi cient, for 
assigning liability (Hamilton, 1978; Hart & Honore, 1985), it is sometimes both, as 
in strict product liability law. In most cases, causation is a necessary minimal com-
ponent of liability and is frequently the major fact-in-issue. An increasing number 
of product liability cases has focused on causation. For example, can Agent Orange 
or electromagnetic radiation cause cancer? Does anti-depressant medication produce 
aggressive behavior? The combination of more cases being fi led (Kakalik & Pace, 
1986) and scientifi c technological advances means that scientifi c evidence is being 
used to resolve an increasing number of such disputes (Braun, 1982; Imwinkelreid, 
1 Although attributions of causality and responsibility are highly correlated, they are partially separable. One 
may be legally liable for an injury without actually causing it, and vice versa (Fincham & Jaspers, 1980; Ham-
ilton, 1978; Lloyd-Bostock, 1983).Although we recognize this important distinction, the relationship between 
causality and responsibility is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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1983). Where causation is the only fact-in-issue, an attribution of liability is a simple 
refl ection of the causal attribution. 
The purpose of the present research is to investigate the effect of extra-legal factors 
on jurors’ judgments in a simulated product liability trial. The relative infl uence, and 
possible interaction, of both case-specifi c and juror-specifi c factors will be assessed. 
CASE-SPECIFIC EXTRA-LEGAL FACTORS
Most experimental demonstrations of the case-related factors that infl uence jurors’2 
verdicts have focused on criminal trials (Dane & Wrightsman, 1982; Kalven & Zeisel, 
1966; Kerr, 1982; Reskin & Visher, 1986; Shaffer, 1985). For example, mock jurors 
are infl uenced by criminal defendants’ race (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Ug-
wuegbu, 1979), physical attractiveness (Landy & Aronson, 1969; Efran, 1974; Sigall 
& Ostrove, 1975), and sex (Cruse & Leigh, 1987), as well as by evidence that has 
been ruled inadmissible (Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973; Thompson, Fong, & Rosen-
han, 1981). 
Some research has been done on civil trails as well. Civil outcomes are infl uenced 
by the status of both real (Chin & Peterson, 1985) and mock defendants (Bornstein, 
in press; Greene, 1989; Hans & Ermann, 1989); the severity of the plaintiff’s inju-
ry (Walster, 1966) and the opportunity to provide compensation (Bornstein, 1993); 
the number of plaintiffs involved (Horowitz & Bordens, 1988); the way in which ex-
pert testimony is presented (Diamond & Casper, 1992); how the standard of proof 
is expressed (Kagehiro & Stanton, 1985); and whether an individual appears as the 
plaintiff or the defendant (Lupfer, Cohen, Bernard, & Schippman, 1985). In each in-
stance, jurors are infl uenced by information other than the formal evidence admitted 
at trial. 
      Thus, jurors are often unable to limit their judgments to the formal evidence, re-
lying on their prior beliefs and expectations. In product liability cases, one factor that 
might infl uence jurors’ verdicts is their intuition about what types of substances or 
events (collectively referred to as “sources”) are likely to cause certain kinds of inju-
ry. For example, people might naively assume, in the absence of scientifi c evidence, 
that cancer is less likely to be caused by an ingested substance, like medication, than 
by an environmental contaminant, like toxic waste. Kraus and Slovic (1988) and 
Kraus, Malmfors, & Slovic (1992) have found that people tend to share. intuitions 
about what types of sources pose the greatest risk of causing various diseases. Given 
those naive assumptions and the general effect of prior expectations on jurors’ judg-
2 Most research on jury decision-making has used “mock” jurors, performing simulated tasks, rather than real ju-
rors. Comparisons of mock jurors to real ones are few, and they offer confl icting results (MacCoun, 1989). What 
little research has been done using actual jurors (e.g., Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Reskin & Visher, 1986) indicates 
that making decisions with real consequences does not guarantee impartial, bias-free performance; rather, the 
same general processes appear to be operating in both actual and mock jurors. Also, the effect of extra-legal fac-
tors will not necessarily be reduced in more realistic simulations (Bray & Kerr, 1982; Kramer & Kerr, 1989). 
Nonetheless, it is indisputable that more realistic simulations and, if possible, real jurors need to be used to es-
tablish the broader applicability of experimental fi ndings. Research on individual differences in juror decision-
making (discussed below) supports the frequently made arguments challenging the ecological validity of much 
psycholegal experimentation (e.g., Bray & Kerr, 1982; Weiten & Diamond, 1979). 
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ments, it follows that jurors will rely on their intuitions where the cause of an injury is 
the principal fact-in-issue. 
In product liability cases, jurors’ attributions should be based on the evidence pre-
sented in court as to whether or not something is capable of causing a certain type of 
injury (cf. Devitt et at., 1992). The variability and unpredictability found in such cas-
es (Huber, 1988) suggest that extra-legal factors are at work. The present experiments 
specifi cally test the hypothesis that subjects’ attributions of liability will be infl u-
enced by their intuitions about what types of sources cause a certain kind of injury. 
JUROR-SPECIFIC EXTRA-LEGAL FACTORS
Nearly all of the extant research on the effect of jurors’ characteristics on their ver-
dicts has used criminal cases (cf. Penrod, 1990). On the whole, attitudinal or per-
sonality variables are stronger predictors than demographic variables like sex, age, 
or race. The most consistent relationships that have been discovered are for attitudes 
towards authority and capital punishment. Authoritarianism is positively correlated 
with guilt judgments and sentence length for both actual (Moran & Comfort, 1982) 
and mock jurors (Bray & Noble, 1978). An abundance of research (reviewed by Ells-
worth, 1988) has shown that “death-qualifi ed” jurors are pro-prosecution and more 
likely to convict, compared to those that contain individuals who would normally be 
excluded from serving in capital cases (Cowan, Thomson, & Ellsworth 1984). 
Fulero and Penrod (1990), in a recent review of the effi cacy of scientifi c jury se-
lection, fi nd a modest relationship between demographic variables and juror ver-
dicts. This somewhat tentative conclusion refl ects the fact that some studies have 
found no relationship (e.g., Baldwin & McConville, 1979 and 1980, reporting on 
actual jurors), while others have found a relationship for some variables but not oth-
ers. This inconsistency is due at least in part to the mediating effect of the type of 
case (Horowitz, 1980; Patterson, 1986). For example, in a rape case, female mock 
jurors are more likely than males to fi nd a rape defendant guilty (Thornton, 1977; 
Ugwuegbu, 1979); when the crime is murder, however, there is no sex difference 
(Bray & Noble, 1978). 
The importance of jurors’ sex in combination with other personality and demo-
graphic factors has been addressed by three studies of actual jurors in trials for a va-
riety of felonies (regrettably, type of crime was not a factor in any of the analyses). 
Bridgeman and Marlowe (1979) found no sex effect at all, while the other two stud-
ies found interactions between sex and a number of other factors. Specifi cally, Mills 
and Bohannon (1980) found that socialization scores were positively correlated with 
guilty verdicts for males, but negatively for females; empathetic males were more 
likely to acquit, but not empathetic females; and autonomous jurors were more like-
ly to acquit, regardless of sex. Moran and Comfort (1982), looking at a slightly differ-
ent constellation of variables, found that males who convicted had more children and 
higher socialization and social desirability scores, while females who convicted had 
higher just-world scores, higher empathy, and less anomie. 
In civil cases, there is a tendency for jurors to favor plaintiffs of their own sex, but 
the effect is somewhat ambiguous and inconsistent for the separate dependent vari-
ables of verdict and monetary damages (Stephan, 1975). Overall, although jurors’ sex 
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appears to have a defi nite effect on their verdicts, the precise nature of the relation-
ship is far from clear. Sex serves as a moderating variable for a number of other fac-
tors, and its infl uence varies across different types of case—both civil versus criminal 
and for different crimes. 
The relationship of socioeconomic status to jurors’ verdicts is not much clearer. Si-
mon (1967) found that high-status jurors were less likely to acquit a defendant by rea-
son of insanity; this result is supported by other studies showing that jurors with high 
SES are, across a variety of offenses, more likely to convict and to give harsher sen-
tences (Adler, 1973; Reed, 1965). However, other studies investigating the effect of 
SES components like education and income level have yielded opposite results (Feild, 
1978; Moran & Comfort, 1982). Although little research has been done on SES and 
civil verdicts, there appears to be little systematic relationship (Stephan, 1975). 
Two of the more prominent ways in which simulated juries often differ from ac-
tual juries is in their racial composition and the overabundance on simulated juries of 
college subjects (Bray & Kerr, 1982). It is somewhat surprising, then, that few studies 
have directly compared subjects’ verdicts as a function of race or student status. Such 
comparisons are crucial, in light of other individuals differences that have been found 
and the constitutional mandate to have representative juries. 
What little research has been conducted on these variables suggests that there are 
potentially important differences. Two studies of actual criminal trials have found a 
main effect of race, such that whites were more likely to convict than blacks (Broed-
er, 1959; Simon, 1967). Using a simulated rape case, Ugwuegbu (1979) found a more 
subtle effect of race: white subjects judged a black defendant more culpable than a 
white defendant, but black defendants displayed the opposite pattern. 
With regard to student status, some studies indicate greater leniency among stu-
dents than in a sample drawn from the community (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983), 
Simon & Mahan, 1971), though at least one study has failed to replicate this fi nd-
ing (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988).Again, one possible mediator is the type of trial: stu-
dents were more likely to acquit in trials for murder (Simon & Mahan, 1971) and 
conspiracy (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983), but not when the charge was armed rob-
bery (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988).Research is needed that explicitly compares the ef-
fect of various demographic factors for different types of trial (cf. Patterson, 1986; 
Penrod, 1990). 
Neither jurors’ race nor their student status has been examined in civil trials. 
Thus, a secondary aim of the present experiments is to assess the relationship be-
tween these and selected other demographic variables and subjects’ verdicts in a 
simulated product liability trial. 
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 compares subjects’ liability judgments in a product liability trial, as a 
function of the source of the plaintiff’s injury. The effects of Injury Source on subjects’ 
evaluation of the evidence, compensation awards, and feelings toward the defendant 
and plaintiff are assessed separately. Since both compensatory and punitive damages 
are paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, there is little practical distinction between the 
two, and either type may serve as a deterrent (Landes & Posner, 1987). In order to mini-
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mize potential confusion on the part of subjects between the different types of damages, 
punitive damages were not investigated in the present experiment. The case is simpli-
fi ed so that the sole fact-in-issue is causation; that is, whether the defendant’s product is 
capable of causing the plaintiff’s injury. Subjects’ task, as it would be for actual jurors, 
is to estimate the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury, and from 
that judgment to reach a decision about liability and damages. 
In order to explore the relationship between subject demographic factors and ver-
dicts, as well as possible interactions between those factors and Injury Source, a large 
and diverse sample was used. 
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 239 persons recruited in front of a busy Baton Rouge department store 
that serves a diverse clientele. The only criteria for inclusion were American citizen-
ship and age over 18, meaning that all subjects were potentially eligible jurors. Sub-
jects received $5 for their participation. 
Materials and Design
Subjects read about a hypothetical lawsuit, modifi ed from actual cases (Huber, 
1988; Weinstein, Mansfi eld, Abrams, & Berger, 1988), involving a plaintiff who 
had developed ovarian cancer. This particular disease was chosen because little 
is known about its etiology. There were three different versions of the case, de-
pending on what the plaintiff alleged caused her illness: a special ink used in her 
hobby of calligraphy, her birth control pills, or a chemical from a nearby dump 
that had leaked into the neighborhood’s water supply. The injury sources were se-
lected to represent three different types of commonly perceived sources of health 
risks-chemical waste, other environmental contaminants, and medication (Kraus & 
Slovic, 1988; Kraus et al., 1992)-while being plausible within the experimental sce-
nario. In each condition, the plaintiff had been exposed to the defendant’s product 
for approximately ten years with no previous problems. 
The case was one single-spaced page long and contained the following elements: 
a description of the plaintiff and her injury; a description of the defendant and alleged 
cause; the major issue—whether or not the defendant’s product causes ovarian can-
cer—and amount requested in damages; and expert scientifi c testimony on both sides, 
as to whether or not the defendant’s product is capable of causing ovarian cancer. Ex-
cept for the alleged cause of the plaintiff’s injury, the case materials were identical for 
all conditions. The identity of the defendant was varied to be consistent with the al-
leged injury source but was a large company in all conditions (i.e., a large ink manu-
facturer, drug company, or chemical company). 
Procedure
A table was set up near the store entrance, with a sign requesting participants for a 
paid survey. As subjects approached to volunteer, they were randomly assigned to one 
of the three experimental conditions and given a questionnaire, clipboard, and brief 
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oral description of the task. They were then shown to a quiet spot away from pedestri-
an traffi c to complete the questionnaire individually.3
The fi rst two pages of the questionnaire contained instructions informing the sub-
jects that the experiment’s purpose was to address how people make decisions about 
legal liability, in a case with opposing scientifi c evidence about whether or not some-
thing is capable of causing a certain type of injury. Subjects were told that “Your 
job is to decide whether or not the defendant is liable for the plaintiff’s injury and 
how much money (if any) the plaintiff should receive from the defendant in damag-
es.” The instructions contained defi nitions of important legal terms, such as “liable,” 
“plaintiff,” “defendant,” and “compensatory damages.” Subjects were also instruct-
ed on the preponderance of the evidence standard and “to determine the facts solely 
from the evidence presented in the case.” 
After reading the case summary, subjects made a number of responses, described 
below. Subjects completed the questionnaire in 15–20 minutes. They were then paid, 
thanked, and given the opportunity to ask any questions about the study. 
Dependent Variables
Subjects answered fi ve questions concerning the case: 1. Verdict. 2. Causation esti-
mate: On a scale from 0–100, “How likely is it that the defendant caused the plain-
tiff’s injury?” The 100-point scale allowed subjects to make fi ner assessments of the 
evidence than a dichotomous verdict, and hence allows more precise statistical com-
parisons. A preponderance of the evidence was defi ned as any score above 50. 3. Com-
pensation. 4. and 5. Sympathy for the plaintiff and defendant, rated on a scale from –
100 to + 100, where negative numbers indicate negative feelings, positive numbers 
show positive feelings, and 0 means indifference. These questions were included to 
see if the subjects’ feelings toward the litigants varied depending on the source of the 
plaintiff’s injury or subject variables. 
In addition, subjects were asked to provide demographic information on race, age, 
sex, education level, income level, and student status. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results are presented for each of the dependent variables separately. Sex of sub-
ject had no main effect on any measure and was involved in only one marginally sig-
nifi cant interaction, 4 so the data are collapsed across sex. Primary analyses include 
the factors of Injury Source, Student Status, and Race. A subset of the demographic 
variables (Education, Income, and Age) varied substantially only within the non-stu-
dent sample, so their effect is considered separately. 
3 In focusing on individual judgments in the absence of deliberation, the procedure is not a wholly accurate rep-
resentation of actual jury behavior; however, a number of researchers have found that the jury’s verdict almost 
always refl ects the majority of individual members’ predeliberation judgments (e.g., Hastie, Penrod, & Penning-
ton, 1983; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). 
4 A tendency for females to feel more sympathy for the plaintiff than males was greater among student subjects 
than among non-students (F(1, 209) = 3.3, p < .08). This effect is likely due to college females’ identifying more 
with the plaintiff, who is portrayed as being 32 years old. However, since there is no main effect of Sex, and the 
interaction between Sex and Student Status is only marginally signifi cant and is not refl ected in subjects’ liability 
judgments as well, the remaining analyses are collapsed across Sex. 
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Sample Characteristics
Characteristics of the sample are displayed in Table 1. Subjects were classifi ed as 
either students, if they indicated that they attended a college or university full-time 
(mean age = 23.2), or non-students (mean age = 32.2). Since there were very few sub-
jects whose race was neither white nor black, Race was analyzed by comparing white 
to minority subjects (analyses including separate categories for blacks and “others”—
e.g., Hispanic, Asian-American—yielded the same pattern of results). A small num-
ber of subjects declined to provide all or some of the requested demographic informa-
tion, so the number of subjects used in each analysis varies slightly. 
Liability Judgments
Subjects made two judgments relevant to liability: a dichotomous verdict and an esti-
mate of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury. 
Verdicts
Although the evidence was the same across conditions, subjects evaluated it differently 
depending on whom the plaintiff was suing. They were more likely to fi nd for the plain-
tiff when she alleged that her injury was caused by a toxic chemical (61% found the 
defendant liable) than by birth control pills (37% liable) or calligraphy ink (40% liable 
χ2(2) = 11.42, p < .005; see Table 2). Student subjects were neither more nor less likely 
to fi nd for the plaintiff than subjects drawn from the community; however, race did affect 
subjects’ verdicts. Minority subjects were signifi cantly more likely to decide in favor of 
the plaintiff than white subjects (χ2(1) = 5.69 , p < .02; see Table 3). Since some research 
indicates that jurors tend to favor litigants to whom they are similar (Stephan, 1975), it 
should be pointed out here that the race of the plaintiff herself was not specifi ed. 
Causation Estimates
Subjects’ estimates of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s inju-
ry were analyzed in a three-way ANOVA with the between-subject factors of Inju-
ry Source, Student Status, and Race. Seven subjects failed to provide an estimate and 
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were dropped from the analysis. Consistent with the Verdict data, only Injury Source 
(F(2, 216) = 5.42, p < .005) and Race (F(1, 216) = 5.15, p < .025) exerted main ef-
fects. The chemical company was judged more likely to have caused her injury than 
either of the other two defendants (Tukey HSD, p’s < .01; see Table 2), while minori-
ties gave higher probability estimates than whites (see Table 3). 
As with subjects’ verdicts, there was no main effect of Student Status (F(1, 216) = 
1.5, ns); however, it interacted with both Injury Source (F(2, 216) = 3.38, p < .05) and 
Race (F(1, 216) = 8.65, p < .005). As can be seen in Figure 1, white and minority students 
did not differ, while minority community subjects rated the probability that the defendant 
caused the plaintiff’s injury much higher than did white community subjects (means: 57.2 
vs. 36.6). Students and non-students both perceived the chemical company’s waste prod-
uct as most likely to have caused the injury, but non-students’ causation estimates were 
higher for the calligraphy ink than for the birth-control pill (though not signifi cantly), 
while students viewed the latter two sources as equally likely (see Figure 2). 
Thus, the verdict results were corroborated by subjects’ estimates of the probability 
that the defendant had caused the plaintiff’s injury. Although the scientifi c evidence about 
whether or not the defendant’s product could have caused the injury was the same in each 
condition, subjects’ evaluation of that evidence was not; rather, they were signifi cantly in-
fl uenced by both the case-specifi c factor of what product had allegedly caused the injury, 
and the subject-specifi c factor of race. Both of these factors also interacted with Student 
Status, though whether or not subjects were students did not have a main effect. 
Compensation
Compensation awards were analyzed for only those subjects who found the defendant 
liable (n = 106). Since the plaintiff’s injury was the same in all conditions, her com-
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pensatory damages should not vary as a function of either the alleged source of the 
injury or subject demographic characteristics. Although compensation awards were 
higher, on average, for the chemical Injury Source, for students, and for minority sub-
jects, none of the effects (nor interactions) was signifi cant. 
Sympathy
Subjects rated their sympathy for the litigants on a scale that ranged from –100 (strong 
negative feelings) to +100 (strong positive feelings). The alleged Source of the plain-
tiff’s injury, subjects’ Race, and subjects’ Student Status had no effect on how favor-
able an impression the plaintiff made (F’s < 1.5). On the other hand, Injury Source 
did affect subjects’ feelings toward the defendant (F(2, 222) = 3.57, p < .03). They 
viewed the ink manufacturer (mean sympathy rating = 15.3, SD = 43.5) as more sym-
pathetic than either the chemical manufacturer (mean sympathy = 0.5, SD = 54.7) or 
drug company (mean sympathy = 1.1, SD 44.6; all pairwise comparisons n.s.). Thus, 
there is a close relationship between subjects’ feelings toward the defendant and their 
liability judgments; defendants judged less likely to have caused the plaintiff’s injury 
are viewed more favorably (cf. Bornstein, 1993; in press). 
In addition, there were main effects of both Race (F(1, 222) = 5.40, p < .025) and 
Student Status (F(1, 222) = 6.11, p < .02). Minorities were more sympathetic toward 
the defendant than white subjects (means: 14.0 vs. –1.3), and community subjects were 
Figure 1. Effect of Race and Student Status on causation judgments in Experiment 1. Probability of causation 
was estimated on a scale from 0 (injury not in any way caused by the defendant) to 100 (defendant defi nitely 
caused the injury).
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more sympathetic than students (means: 12.4 vs. –2.8). There were no signifi cant inter-
actions among Injury Source, Race, and Student Status on sympathy for either litigant. 
The effect of subjects’ race and student status on defendant sympathy is inconsis-
tent with their liability judgments. Community subjects were more favorably disposed 
toward the defendant, yet no more likely to reach a verdict in his favor, than student 
subjects; while minority subjects were more favorably disposed toward the defendant, 
yet paradoxically more likely to fi nd against him, than white subjects. The source of 
the plaintiff’s injury, on the other hand, elicited the same pattern of fi ndings for both 
defendant sympathy and liability judgments. These results suggest that subjects’ prior 
beliefs about the type of source most likely to cause a certain injury are a more reli-
able predictor of their liability judgments than are their feelings towards the litigants. 
Demographic Variables within the Non-Student Sample
Sample Characteristics
Community subjects varied in terms of their education, income, and age. The effect of 
these variables on subjects’ judgments is analyzed for the non-student subsample (n 
= 130). Educational background was analyzed by splitting subjects into three groups: 
those with only a high school education or less (n = 31); those who had attended col-
lege (n = 68); and those who had done post-graduate work (n = 31). The four annual 
income categories used were: < $20,000, $20,000–$50,000, $50,000–$ 100, 000, and 
Figure 2. Effect of Student Status and Injury Source on causation judgments in Experiment 1. Probability of cau-
sation was estimated on a scale from 0 (injury not in any way caused by me defendant) to 100 (defendant defi -
nitely caused me injury).
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> $ 100,000. Twelve subjects did not provide their income level; of those who did, 
very few reported earning more than $50,000/year (n = 17). Thus, for the purpose of 
analysis, subjects were split into two roughly equal-sized groups: those earning less 
than $20,000/year (n = 54), and those earning more than $20,000 (n = 64). Interac-
tions between Injury Source and the variables of Education and Income could not be 
tested because of unequal frequency distribution across some of the cells. 
Liability Judgments
Both education and income had a signifi cant effect on non-student subjects’ verdicts. 
Subjects whose formal education did not go beyond high school were twice as like-
ly to fi nd for the plaintiff as for the defendant, while those who had done post-grad-
uate work were twice as likely to fi nd for the defendant; subjects who had attended 
college but not beyond were about equally likely to fi nd the defendant liable as not 
(χ2(2) = 8.29, p < .02; see Table 4). A similar relationship was found between income 
and verdicts: subjects in the low-income group found in favor of the plaintiff 57% of 
the time, while those in the high-income group found for the plaintiff only 36% of the 
time (χ2(1) = 5.44, p < .02). 
Causation estimates were analyzed in a two-way analysis of covariance, with ed-
ucation and income as the between-subject factors and age as a covariate. The only 
signifi cant effect was for education (F(2, 106) = 2.79, p < .07), with subjects’ esti-
mates of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiffs injury decreasing as 
level of education increased (see Table 4). Taking education and income together as 
indicators of SES, higher-status subjects were more likely to fi nd for the civil defen-
dant than relatively low-status subjects. This result is incongruent with studies that 
have shown a tendency for high-SES jurors to judge criminal defendants more harsh-
ly (Adler, 1973; Reed, 1965; Simon, 1967). 
Compensation
Including both Income and Education in the same model resulted in too few subjects in 
some of the cells, since only subjects who fi rst found the defendant liable could be includ-
ed in the analysis of compensation; hence, the two factors are analyzed separately. Neither 
education nor income affected community subjects’ compensation awards, though age 
was found to be a signifi cant covariate for education (F(1, 47) = 4.2, p < .05). 
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Sympathy
Subjects’ ratings of how sympathetic they felt toward the litigants were also ana-
lyzed by two-way ANCOVAs. There were no signifi cant effects on sympathy for 
the plaintiff (Fs < 1). Sympathy for the defendant, however, was affected by educa-
tion level (F(2, 190) = 4.01; p < .025). Even though they were more likely to fi nd 
for the plaintiff, subjects in the lowest educational category felt the most favorably 
toward the defendant (means: high school education: 39.1 (SD = 58.8); college edu-
cation: 1.6 (SD = 45.5); post-graduate education: 10.0 (SD 45.3); high school > col-
lege, p < .05, other pairwise comparisons n.s.). 
The effect of education on sympathy for the defendant supports the fi nding, reported 
above, that Race infl uences sympathy for the defendant. Race and Education were sig-
nifi cantly correlated χ2(2) = 6.0, p < .05), with whites disproportionately more likely 
to have attained higher levels of educational achievement. Education and Income were 
also positively associated (χ2(2) = 29.9, p < .001). Thus, as has been widely established, 
there is an association between Race and SES. Nonetheless, each factor exerts an inde-
pendent effect on mock jurors’ liability judgments. The effect of SES-particularly Edu-
cation-on subjects’ feelings toward the defendant, as well as their liability judgments, 
parallels the effect of Race. Minority subjects are both more likely to fi nd for the plain-
tiff and more sympathetic towards the defendant, as are poorly educated subjects. 
EXPERIMENT 2
Across all demographic variables, subjects’ attributions of liability varied depend-
ing on the alleged source of the plaintiff’s injury. The assumption that jurors can 
make their judgments on the basis of the evidence alone confl icts with widely ac-
cepted normative standards for reasoning under uncertainty, such as Bayes’ Theo-
rem (see Edwards, 1968; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). Bayesian theory prescribes 
the inclusion of the decision maker’s prior expectations in assessing the probabili-
ty of a hypothesis-for example, in estimating the probability that a civil defendant 
caused a plaintiff’s injury. According to Bayesian theory, if a juror has a non-ev-
identiary, extra-legal belief that is relevant to a fact-in-issue, she ought to use it 
(Bornstein & Baron, 1993). Many extra-legal characteristics might exert their ef-
fect by drawing on subjects’ prior beliefs. For example, Bornstein (in press) found 
that mock jurors’ tendency to fi nd against corporate defendants more often than in-
dividual defendants was associated with different attitudes toward the two types of 
defendant (see also Hans & Ermann, 1989); for instance, corporate defendants were 
perceived as more likely to cause harm. In deciding cases with corporate and indi-
vidual defendants differently, subjects relied on their expectations about the defen-
dant’s status as an additional piece of evidence. 
In addition to being unavoidable, the incorporation of such beliefs is rational 
from a Bayesian perspective. In estimating the posterior probability that a defen-
dant’s product caused the plaintiff’s injury, one should include both the new ev-
idence presented at trial (scientifi c testimony) and one’s prior probability, in the 
form of intuitions about “what causes what.” If subjects rely on their expectations 
in making liability attributions, they are violating legal guidelines; but if they pos-
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sess a relevant prior belief regarding Injury Source, they are behaving like com-
petent and thorough decision-makers. The present experiment was designed to ex-
plore the nature of subjects’ intuitions about what causes ovarian cancer. In order to 
measure subjects’ naive intuitions, the plaintiff from Experiment 1 was presented as 
a medical case history, with no scientifi c evidence or any information indicating a 
lawsuit had been fi led. The results of Experiment 1 lead to the prediction that sub-
jects will perceive chemical waste as more likely to cause ovarian cancer than ei-
ther birth control medication or calligraphy ink. 
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 48 adults recruited at the same location as subjects in Experiment 1. 
Subjects received $1 for their participation. 
Materials and Design
Subjects read a case history describing a woman who suffers from ovarian cancer. 
The case was identical to Experiment 1, except the woman was referred to as “the 
patient” instead of “the plaintiff.” Under “possible illness factors,” the history men-
tioned the patient’s exposure to the three levels of Injury Source used in Experiment 
1. The presentation order of the Injury Sources was counterbalanced within subjects, 
so that each causal factor was presented in the fi rst, second, or third position for one-
third of the subjects. No scientifi c evidence about causality was included, in order to 
assess subjects’ naive intuitions. 
Procedure
The general procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. The written instructions 
informed subjects that the experiment addressed what types of events people think 
cause certain kinds of injury or disease. Subjects were told “Based on what you will 
be told about the patient’s personal history . . . your job is to estimate how much each 
factor is responsible for the disease.” After reading the patient’s case history, subjects 
rated the contribution to her illness of all three factors on a seven- point Likert scale 
(where I = extremely unlikely to cause ovarian cancer, and 7 = extremely likely to 
cause ovarian cancer). Subjects were also asked to provide demographic information 
and if they had ever personally experienced any of the three factors. The experiment 
too approximately fi ve minutes to complete. 
RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
Overall, there was a very high degree of similarity between the Experiment 1 and Ex-
periment 2 subject samples, although the present sample was somewhat better- edu-
cated and contained slightly fewer non-white subjects (see Table 1). 
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Causation Estimates
The primary dependent measure was subjects’ estimate of the likelihood of different 
Injury Sources causing ovarian cancer. Based on the results of Experiment 1, it was 
predicted that subjects would judge exposure to a chemical from a nearby dump as 
more likely to cause ovarian cancer than exposure to either birth control pills or cal-
ligraphy ink. Subjects’ estimates were signifi cantly different across the types of Inju-
ry Source (F(2, 94) = 58.84, p < .001). As predicted, exposure to the chemical (mean 
= 5.4, SD = 1.5) was rated more likely to cause cancer than either birth control pills 
(mean = 4.0, SD = 1.8; t(47) = 4.17, p < .001) or calligraphy ink (mean = 2.1, SD = 
1.2; t(47) = 12.29, p < .001). The difference between birth control pills and calligra-
phy ink was tested and was also found to be signifi cant (t(47) = 6.26, p < .001); sub-
jects perceived the pills as more likely to cause ovarian cancer than the ink. 
Thus, people have strong intuitions about what factors are more or less likely to 
cause ovarian cancer. These intuitions underlie the main result of Experiment 1, that 
a plaintiff’s chance of winning depends on what she alleges to have caused her injury. 
Simulated jurors incorporate their expectations with the evidence presented at trial in 
making attributions of causality and, ultimately, responsibility. 
Effect of Demographic Variables
There was no effect of subjects’ Sex or Student Status on their ratings of the dif-
ferent Injury Sources. This fi nding is consistent with the results of Experiment 1, 
which showed no main effect of either Sex or Student Status on subjects’ liabili-
ty judgments. On the other hand, subjects’ Race did affect their judgments in Ex-
periment 1. In the present experiment, however, minorities did not perceive any of 
the factors as more likely to cause ovarian cancer than white subjects (t’s < 1.8). 
Although there is a clear effect of Race on liability judgments, it appears to derive 
from a source other than differential intuitions about the likelihood of specifi c fac-
tors causing ovarian cancer (though this conclusion should be considered tentative, 
given the relatively small number of minority subjects in the present experiment).
One explanation might be that individuals of different races have different intu-
itions about the global probability of developing ovarian cancer. Such a belief could 
serve as a more general intuitive base-rate in attributing liability; it would not be re-
fl ected in the present experiment, which addresses beliefs about specifi c causes. Al-
ternatively, whites and minorities might process scientifi c evidence of the sort pre-
sented in Experiment 1 differently, or have divergent opinions about its credibility. 
Further research is needed to explore the reasons for racial differences in making li-
ability judgments. 
Prior Experience
Very few subjects had lived near a chemical dump (n = 5) or used special calligraphy 
ink (n = 8), but 73% of female subjects had used birth control pills. However, they 
rated them as likely to cause ovarian cancer as females who had not (t < 1). Thus, 
there was no discernible relationship between subjects’ personal experiences and their 
intuitions about disease causation. 
142 BORNSTEIN & RAJKI IN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND THE LAW 12 (1994)
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research has sought to identify extra-legal factors that infl uence judg-
ments in a simulated product liability trial. Subjects’ liability judgments were affected 
by both case-specifi c and subject-specifi c factors. 
Case-Specifi c Extra-Legal Factors
Subjects’ verdicts differed for cases that were identical except for the alleged cause of 
the plaintiff’s injury. Even though the scientifi c evidence presented as to whether or 
not the defendant’s product was capable of causing the injury was the same—regard-
less of the source of the injury—subjects were more likely to fi nd the defendant lia-
ble if it was a chemical company than if it was a birth control pill or ink manufacturer. 
Thus, they did not base their decisions solely on the evidence presented at trial, as le-
gal instructions prescribe (Devitt et al., 1992), but relied also on the extra-legal char-
acteristic of the source of the injury. 
Cognitive processes that govern people’s everyday thinking should appear in ju-
rors’ reasoning as well (Arkes, 1989; Saks & Kidd, 1980). One such process is a re-
liance on prior knowledge and expectations. The effect of Injury Source on subjects’ 
verdicts was found to refl ect varying intuitions people have about “what causes what.” 
The more likely they believe a product is to cause a particular disease, the more like-
ly they are to fi nd a civil defendant who makes that product liable, in cases where the 
plaintiff suffers from the disease; they also feel less favorably toward the defendant. 
The fi nding that subjects were most likely to fi nd the chemical company liable 
is almost certainly specifi c to the particular disease that was used. The same three 
sources might be evaluated completely differently if the plaintiff suffered from an-
other disease. In addition to varying across different types of injury, perceptions of 
causality and risk often vary across cultures as well (Englander et al., 1986; Gos-
zczynska, Tyszka, & Slovic, 1991; Teigen, Brun, & Slovic, 1988). Within cultures, 
there is considerable agreement in people’s perceptions of what is most likely to 
cause certain kinds of injury (Kraus & Slovic, 1988; Kraus et al. , 1992), but fur-
ther research is needed to specify more precisely people’s perception of the rela-
tionship between various diseases, disease sub-types (e.g., types of cancer), and 
different types of injury source (e.g., prescription medication, environmental con-
taminants, etc.). 
Subjects in the present experiments used Injury Source as diagnostic information 
in making their decisions. In doing so, they violated legal guidelines, but they be-
haved as optimal decision-makers by relying on their prior expectations, as well as 
the newly presented evidence, in making a decision under conditions of uncertain-
ty. One problem that arises from jurors’ reliance on their prior beliefs is that those be-
liefs might be erroneous. The accuracy of such beliefs is an empirical question; re-
search could show, for example, whether exposure to birth control pills, high-grade 
ink, or certain chemicals is more likely to cause ovarian cancer. Unfortunately, the be-
liefs’ accuracy is generally not known, especially by the individuals making the deci-
sion. Thus, jurors’ assumptions are put in the class of evidence that, though relevant 
to the decision-in terms of making a fact-in-issue more or less probable—is not used 
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because of potential misuse (Koehler & Shaviro, 1990). However, the accuracy of ju-
rors’ intuitions is separate from the issue of whether or not they have a normative ba-
sis in the decision-making process itself (Bornstein & Baron, 1993). Research dem-
onstrating the infl uence of case-specifi c extra-legal factors has traditionally ignored 
the relationship between those factors and jurors’ belief systems. 
Juror-Specifi c Extra-Legal Factors
In addition to the effect of Injury Source, the impact on subjects’ liability judgments 
of a number of demographic variables was assessed. The characteristic that had the 
greatest effect on subjects’ behavior was Race. Minority subjects felt more sympathy 
toward the defendant than white subjects, yet they were more likely to fi nd in favor 
of the plaintiff. Level of Education and Income, which were correlated with Race, op-
erated in the same fashion. The greater tendency of minorities and low-SES individ-
uals to fi nd for the plaintiff is inconsistent with the effect of those variables in crimi-
nal trials. In general, black (Broeder, 1959; Simon, 1967) and low-SES (Alder, 1973; 
Reed, 1965) jurors have been found to be more lenient toward criminal defendants. 
Although civil and criminal trials are similar in many respects (Hans, 1992), they are 
suffi ciently different that the effect of demographic variables on how jurors treat the 
two kinds of defendant is not constant. Compared to white and high-SES jurors, black 
and low-SES jurors are more likely to reach a verdict that favors criminal defendants, 
who are opposed by the state, but less likely to reach a verdict that favors a civil de-
fendant, who is opposed by a plaintiff. This fi nding may be due to a greater tendency 
on the part of minority jurors to perceive both civil plaintiffs and criminal defendants 
as the “victim” parties in their respective litigation. The differential treatment of civil 
and criminal defendants suggests caution in generalizing from criminal jury selection 
research to the predicted outcome of civil trials (cf. Penrod, 1990). 
Minority subjects were more likely to fi nd in favor of the plaintiff even though 
they did not perceive the various Injury Sources as more likely to cause ovarian can-
cer than whites. According to a normative model of decision-making like Bayesian 
theory, one’s fi nal decision, or posterior probability, should incorporate both previous 
knowledge (i.e., one’s prior probability) and new evidence (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 
1971). Since Race did not affect subjects’ prior intuitions about “what causes what,” 
its effect on their liability judgments-that is, their posterior probability estimates of 
causation-is likely due to the weight they gave to the new evidence. Additional re-
search is needed before any fi rm conclusions can be drawn about possible differenc-
es in evidence usage as a function of race, but minorities might have been more likely 
than whites to interpret the scientifi c evidence presented at trial as favoring the plain-
tiff. In light of the educational disparity between whites and minorities, an explana-
tion linked to their interpretation of expert, scientifi c testimony seems plausible. 
Although the plaintiff was female, there was no effect of Sex on subjects’ verdicts. 
Jurors’ sex has been found to make a difference in some cases but not others (Fulero 
& Penrod, 1990; Stephan, 1975); product liability falls into the class of cases where it 
does not. There was also no effect of Student Status on subjects’ liability judgments, 
though the effect of both Injury Source and Race varied depending on whether or not 
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subjects were college students. For example, the effect of Race was greater for com-
munity than student subjects, which can be explained by the fact that student subjects, 
as a group, would not also have the contributing factor of low SES. 
The absence of any systematic effects of Student Status suggests that the predom-
inance of student subjects in psycholegal research is not, in and of itself, cause for 
concern. Two caveats are in order, however. First the present research used a sin-
gle kind of case. Although previous research has not addressed the impact of Student 
Status on civil trial outcomes, students have been found to be more lenient in some 
criminal cases (e.g., Simon & Mahan, 1971) but not others (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). 
Similarly, the effect of Student Status might fl uctuate across civil case type. It is not 
hard to imagine a personal injury case in which Student Status might make a differ-
ence, such as an underage plaintiff suing a university because he was allowed to drink 
too much at a party on campus and consequently injured himself. 
Second, whether or not one is a student might not be important by itself, but fac-
tors that covary with Student Status could matter a great deal. For example, many 
studies using student subjects also contain a disproportionate number of white sub-
jects. In light of the present fi ndings regarding Race, future researchers, especially 
those investigating jury decisions in product liability cases, should be sensitive to the 
racial makeup of their samples. 
In conclusion, the results of these experiments indicate that subjects’ student status 
did not have a signifi cant effect on their performance as jurors in a simulated prod-
uct liability trial. However, demographic factors that are correlated with student sta-
tus did affect subjects’ liability judgments: minority and relatively poorly educated 
subjects were more likely to fi nd for the plaintiff. Across all demographic categories, 
subjects were infl uenced by the case-specifi c extra-legal factor of the alleged source 
of the plaintiff’s injury. They were more likely to reach a verdict in the plaintiff’s fa-
vor when the alleged source corresponded to their intuitions about what causes a par-
ticular disease than when it did not. 
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